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Abstract
In this paper we analyse job flows in five transition countries, Poland, Estonia,
Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania. Using comparable firm level data over the years
1993-1997, we find that in early transition job destruction dominates job creation,
while the latter is picking up as the country enters into a mature stage of transition.
Gross job reallocation rates in the more advanced transition countries are comparable
to those of Western economies.
We show that the restructuring process is a very heterogeneous one in terms of job
creation and destruction: Even in transition countries, hit by very large negative
shocks, we find that within narrowly defined sectors, regions and firm types
simultaneous creation and destruction of jobs occur. In addition, we find that most of
the job reallocation occurs within sectors and regions, rather than across sectors and
regions. We suggest that a measure for restructuring is the excess job reallocation rate
and show that the excess job reallocation rate is positively correlated with the net
employment growth rate at the sector and regional level.
Finally, we find  that ownership and firm size are the most relevant characteristics for
understanding the dynamics of job flows. Foreign firms have higher job creation and
higher excess job reallocation rates, while small businesses are the most dynamic in
terms of job reallocation. We investigate the job reallocation process at the firm level
and test for trade orientation, ownership and size effects.  The results show that firm
growth depends on ownership and initial size. Trade orientation effects are important
for countries in early transition but not for countries in a more mature stage of the
transition process.
Key words: job creation, job destruction, transition economies;
JEL classification: J6, P2.3
I. Introduction
It is generally known that ‘flexibility’ of the labour market is an important
feature of well-functioning market economies.  Davis and Haltiwanger (1990, 1992)
and Baldwin et al.(1998) report that in the U.S. and in Canada roughly one in every
ten jobs is created and one in every ten jobs is destroyed each year. Flexibility of the
labour market is important because it permits the rapid reallocation of resources to the
most efficient uses and thus it may be vital for economic growth. As suggested by
Aghion and Howitt (1994), we might expect a relationship between gross job creation,
destruction and productivity growth. Firms (sectors) that engage in restructuring
destroy low productivity jobs and create high productivity ones. This leads to high job
turnover and an increase in labour productivity. Therefore, a positive correlation
between productivity growth and job turnover might be expected. However, a high
degree of job reallocation may also have negative effects, at least in the short run, in
terms of worker displacement and earnings losses, but the aggregate and long run
benefits are more likely to compensate the individual costs.
These issues are particularly relevant for the emerging economies of Central
and Eastern Europe. These countries are undertaking reforms in order to move from a
central planning system to a market-based economy. Reallocation of economic
activities, opening up of the input and product markets, reforms of the labour market
and restructuring of existing firms are some of the challenges they face.
The purpose of this paper is to study gross flows of jobs, thereby documenting
the role of labour market adjustment in the transition process. In doing so, we might
indirectly contribute to the ongoing debate between gradual versus rapid approaches
to reform (e.g. Roland, 1994). Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (1998) analyse the role of
labour market flexibility for a small transition economy, Estonia. According to their
findings, Estonia’s transition process is a success story. The country’s rapid approach
to reform has led the economy to sustainable GDP growth and to rates of job
reallocation similar to those reported for western economies. Konings, Lehmann and
Schaffer (1996) analyse gross flows of jobs in Poland at the start of transition and find
high rates of gross job destruction, which are concentrated in state owned enterprises.
This suggests that state owned enterprises in Poland rapidly engaged in initial
restructuring or downsizing. Basu, Estrin and Svejnar (1997) and Estrin and Svejnar
(1998) find in the context of a labour demand model for the Czech, Slovak Republic4
and Poland that firms adjusted their labour force fairly rapidly at the start of
transition. Likewise Sorm and Terrell (1999) use the Czech labour force survey to
document the flexibility of the labour market in terms of worker flows, which
increasingly occur from job-to-job, rather than through unemployment. This is also
what may be expected in the more advanced transition countries.
To date, however, there exists no comparative study that uses representative
micro data to analyse labour market adjustment in terms of gross flows of jobs during
the transition to a market economy in the 1990’s and for countries at different stages
of transition
1. This paper makes a first step in filling this gap. To this end, we analyse
five transition economies, two of which are fairly large, Poland and Romania, having
a total population of 38 and 23 million people, respectively. The other three countries
in our analysis, Estonia, Slovenia and Bulgaria, are small open economies. Poland,
Estonia and Slovenia are advanced countries in transition. Since the early 1990s,
Poland and Estonia aggressively pursued transition by opening the markets,
decentralising wage setting and applying labour market reforms. Slovenia has chosen
a more gradual but equally successful approach to price liberalisation and
privatisation of state-owned enterprises (EBRD, 1998). Bulgaria and Romania have
not succeeded in the transformation yet. In the early 1990s, there was a lack of clear
commitment by their governments to reform. In more recent years, programs of
reforms have been implemented, although hampered by delays and political
constraints (EBRD, 1997 and 1998).
The macroeconomic picture shown in Figures 1 and 2 confirms the relatively
better performance of Poland, Estonia and Slovenia over Bulgaria and Romania. Ten
years after the beginning of transition, Poland, Estonia and Slovenia seem to be
consistently on the upward sloping part of the U-shaped curve of aggregate output,
while Bulgaria and Romania suffered a severe setback a few years after they
experienced a weak recovery. Figure 2 shows that the collapse in employment follows
the collapse in output with some lag, but it persists longer.
                                                                
1 Bilsen and Konings (1998) use a small sample of firms collected through business surveys to study
gross job tunover in Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. The focus of their paper lies on document the
relative dynamism of the de novo firms in transition. Here we focus on the traditional sector, which still
constitutes the bulk of employment in these economies.5
   Source: Transition report, EBRD (1998) and Annual Report, WIIW (1998).
.
Note: Employment data for Estonia and Slovenia are available only from 1994 and 1991,
respectively.
Source: Transition report, EBRD (1998) and Annual Report, WIIW (1998).








































We use an exceptionally rich data set of comparable firm level data for the
five countries over the years, 1993-1997
2, which allows us to construct measures of
gross and net job flows. In addition, we are able to investigate the characteristics of
the businesses contributing to the job flows, i.e. industry, region, ownership and
employer size characteristics.  The data also allows us to compare to gross flows of
jobs for transition countries with gross flows of jobs for western countries, computed
from the same data source. Given the recent interest in labour economics and other
fields in gross job reallocation, we hope that such a comparison will help our
understanding of the adjustment process in the labour market.  In particular, since
transition causes a large macro economic shock, it will be interesting to document
whether in young market economies firms behaviour is as heterogeneous as in the
West and how long it takes before a steady state in the labour market may be reached,
i.e. one in which gross job creation equals job destruction.
We investigate also the job reallocation process at the firm level. Following
the growth-of-firms literature (Audretsch, 1995; Sutton, 1997), we look at the
relationship between firm employment growth and firm size, taking into account
transition-specific effects, i.e. the effects of variables influencing firm growth specific
to countries in transition. Thus, we test for the importance of initial size, ownership
and trade orientation on firm growth.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section II, we describe the data and we
report gross and net job flows at the aggregate level. In section III, we investigate the
characteristics of the businesses contributing to the job flows. We report the average
magnitude of job flows according to sectors, regions,  employer size classes and
ownership types. In section IV, we analyse the decomposition of the excess job
reallocation rate, while in section V we look at the relationship between firm growth
and firm size. We conclude in section VI.
                                                                
2 For Romania we only have observations from 1994 onwards.7
II.  Data Description and Aggregate Job Flows
The unbalanced panel data set at our disposal contains information on more
than 834 firms in Poland, 233 firms in Estonia, 511 firms in Slovenia and 1548 firms
in Bulgaria over the period 1993-1997, and on more than 3776 firms in Romania
between 1994-1997 (see Tab.1). The data consists of the company accounts
3 of all
incorporated firms satisfying at least one of the following criteria: number of
employees greater than 100, total assets and operating revenues exceed 16 million and
8 million USD, respectively. Employment data are retrieved from annual company
accounts published by the Polish InfoCredit, by the Estonian Krediidiinfo AS, by the
Intercredit Ljubljana, by the Creditreform Bulgaria OOD and by the Romanian
Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
Our data have several advantages. First, they are reasonably representative for
the medium and large firms in the manufacturing and the non-manufacturing sector.
Previous work in this field (e.g. Bilsen and Konings, 1998) had to rely on small
samples of firm level survey data, the data set that we use, is a large sample of firms
which provides objective information of the firm and which is representative for the
traditional firms. Because the criteria according to which the data set has been
constructed, firms that do not satisfy at least one of these criteria are excluded. The
result of this selection is that small newly established or de novo private  firms are
underrepresented. A second advantage of the data is that information is provided on
narrowly defined sectors (both manufacturing and non-manufacturing), regions and
ownership shares. This information allows us to analyse the reallocation process at the
sector and regional level, and by ownership type. Unfortunately, data on ownership
are not available for Estonia and Slovenia. Third, the data are in panel form and cover
an intermediate/mature stage of the transition process for the five economies.
Summary statistics on employment in 1993 and 1997 are presented in Table 1.
We report the number of firms, average firm size and standard deviation for each
country, both overall and according to ownership types. We distinguish among three
ownership types: foreign, state and domestic private firms. We refer to foreign firms
as majority foreign-owned enterprises, i.e. firms characterised by a foreign
                                                                
3 Data are available on the Amadeus CD-ROM (Dec. 1998), a Pan European financial database,
provided by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing SA.8
participation in their stock greater than 50%, analogously we refer to state firms as
majority state-owned enterprises, i.e. firms characterised by state participation greater
than 50%. We refer to domestic private firms as the residual category, which includes
privatized firms
4.
For each country average firm size decreases over time: between 1993-1997
Polish firms reduced their size almost by half (43.3%), Estonian and Bulgarian firms
by 38.4% and 36.5%, respectively, while Romanian firms by 30% between 1994-
1997. Slovenian firms reduced their size by only 7.1% between 1993-1997. In
absolute terms, Estonian, Slovenian and Bulgarian firms are on average and over time
smaller than those in  Romania and in Poland. This indicates that downsizing has
occurred which is consistent with the evolution of aggregate employment shown in
figure 2 and which reflects the fact that firms under central planning were generally
too large and over-manned. The removal of subsidies presumably has triggered the
downsizing and hence the reduction in overmanning levels at the firm. However, this
does not necessarily mean that there is no job creation going on or in other words that
there are no firms expanding in the economy. For this reason it is important to look
behind the net aggregate employment flows and to compute the gross flows of jobs.
                                                                
4 Also co-operatives are included in this residual category. However, the number of co-operatives in
our sample is quite small.9















Overall 834 1278 2735 2130 724 1995
State firms 72 2448 4030 78 3053 8674
Foreign firms 47 1008 1032 56 1071 1435
Domestic private
firms
113 1104 1608 164 945 1036
Estonia
Overall 233 396 446 528 244 391
Slovenia
Overall 511 419 626 520 389 504
Bulgaria
Overall 1548 624 2059 2458 396 1549
State firms 586 883 3199 897 524 2308
Foreign firms 38 1087 1399 71 751 1097
Domestic private
firms
745 433 612 943 352 993
Romania*
Overall 3776 722 1868 4558 556 1869
State firms 1648 860 1575 1702 670 1357
Foreign firms 88 370 715 120 469 631
Domestic private
firms
1166 527 959 1323 445 966
Note: (*) 1993 figures refer to 1994 ones. The ownership classification is not available for Estonia and
Slovenia.
We measure gross job creation (pos) as the sum of all employment gains in
expanding firms in a given year divided by the total employment at the beginning of
the year
5. Likewise we define gross job destruction ( neg) as the sum of all
employment losses in contracting firms in a given year divided by total employment
at the beginning of the year. The sum of gross job creation and gross job destruction
gives a measure for gross job reallocation (gross) and the difference yields the net
employment growth rate (net). Thus a net aggregate employment growth rate of –10%
                                                                
5 Given the nature of our dataset, we cannot interpret firm entry or exit in our sample as firm entry or
exit from the market place. Thus, we apply the standard definition of job flow rates and not the one
suggested by Davis and Haltiwanger (1990,1992), which divides employment change by the average of
employment in periods t and t-1 and it is appropriate in treating symmetrically entry and exit.10
could be generated by a gross job destruction rate of 10% and a gross job creation rate
of 0%, or, a gross job destruction rate of 20% and a gross job creation rate of 10%.
The latter suggests, however, a much more turbulent and flexible adjustment process
in which there are simultaneous contracting and expanding firms and it suggests much
more heterogeneous firm behaviour. This might be an important indicator to assess
the flexibility of the labour market in transition countries. If labour markets are
inflexible then reforms might be hampered exactly due to the poor reallocation
between firms, sectors and regions of jobs.
Table 2 shows the various gross job flow measures for the 5 transition
countries in this study. The different stages in the transition process become apparent
by comparing the countries. In Bulgaria and Romania, the least advanced countries,
the job destruction rate always dominates the job creation rate. For example, in 1997,
the job destruction rate in Romania is 10%, which means that 10 in every 100 jobs is
destroyed, while only 4 in every 100 jobs is created per year. The aggregate
employment growth rate in Romania in 1997 is –6.2%, however, the gross job
creation rate suggests that despite the fact that the Romanian economy is in decline,
there is some job creation going on, at a rate of 3.7%. This suggests that a reallocation
process has started, which cannot be said from Bulgaria with a job creation rate of
only 1.4% and a job destruction rate of 5.2% by 1997. The more advanced countries,
Poland, Estonia and Slovenia, seem to have moved to a “steady state” situation by
1997 in which job creation equals job destruction.
One measure of labour market flexibility is the gross job reallocation rate. It
can be noted that the gross job reallocation rate for Poland, Bulgaria and Slovenia
fluctuates around 9%, for Estonia it is somewhat higher, on average 16% and for
Romania its average is around 12%. This measure of gross job reallocation, however,
reflects to a large degree the evolution in net aggregate employment and does not
necessarily measure the extent that real ‘churning’ of jobs is taking place.
An alternative measure that we use is therefore the excess job reallocation rate
(excess) and is defined as the gross job reallocation rate minus the absolute value of
the net employment growth rate (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992). This measure
indicates the amount of job reallocation that results after taking into account the gross
job reallocation needed to accommodate a given net employment growth. As the gross
job creation rate and the gross job destruction rate measure the flexibility of the labour
market, gross job reallocation and, in particular, excess job reallocation can be11
interpreted also as an index of restructuring. Restructuring of existing firms in
transition countries is vital. It has been noticed (Blanchard, 1997) that if firms want to
survive, they must undertake fundamental changes in the production as well as in the
ownership structure. Firms have to redefine product lines, close down inefficient
plants,  fire unproductive workers and hire workers and managers with the skills
required in a market environment. If reallocation of resources from declining to
growing firms, from declining to growing sectors or regions takes place smoothly we
might expect that restructuring and excess job reallocation are positively correlated. If
the reallocation of resources is difficult and the labour market is inflexible we might
expect that restructuring is more difficult. We therefore suggest that the turbulence
and, thus, the underlying restructuring process will be best reflected in high excess job
reallocation rates. We will illustrate this point more in detail when we discuss gross
job flows at the sector and regional level in next section.
We can notice that Estonia and Slovenia have on average the highest excess
job reallocation, 13% and 8% on average respectively. Interestingly, also Romania
has a high excess job reallocation rate of 8% on average, yet Romania is the country
that seems to be lagging behind on the basis of the aggregate evolution in
employment. The excess job reallocation rate, however, suggests that restructuring is
taking place in Romania and in that respect it is doing better than say Bulgaria with an
average excess job reallocation rate of 5%.
Based on the reported job flow measures it seems that Estonia stands out as
being characterised by a lot of turbulence.  This is also found by Haltiwanger and
Vodopovic (1998), who report worker flows for Estonia that are similar to those
reported by the most dynamic Western economies.12
Table 2: Annual net and gross job flows for Poland, Estonia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and
Romania (1993-1997)
Year/Country pos neg gross net excess
Poland
1994 3.0 6.8 9.8 -3.8 6.0
1995 3.6 6.0 9.6 -2.4 7.2
1996 3.0 5.0 8.0 -2.0 6.0
1997 3.0 3.7 6.7 -0.6 6.1
Estonia
1994 4.6 9.2 13.8 -4.6 9.2
1995 6.4 7.3 13.8 -0.9 12.9
1996 11.2 7.2 18.4 4.0 14.4
1997 9.3 8.8 18.1 0.6 17.5
Slovenia
1994 3.9 4.2 8.1 -0.2 7.9
1995 4.6 5.9 10.5 -1.3 9.2
1996 5.5 5.3 10.8 0.2 10.5
1997 3.3 5.4 8.8 -2.1 6.7
Bulgaria
1994 0.8 7.2 8.0 -6.3 1.7
1995 3.2 3.3 6.5 -0.1 6.4
1996 4.1 7.0 11.1 -2.9 8.2
1997 1.4 5.2 6.6 -3.7 2.9
Romania
1995 4.7 10.1 14.8 -5.4 9.4
1996 3.6 7.1 10.7 -3.5 7.2
1997 3.7 9.9 13.6 -6.2 7.4
International comparisons*
Belgium 3.7 3.4 7.1 0.3 5.7
Netherlands 6.5 2.7 9.1 3.8 5.2
Germany 4.6 4.1 8.7 0.4 6.2
U.K. 5.4 5.4 10.8 -0.1 9.0
Note:  pos  = gross job creation rate,  neg = gross destruction rate,  gross = gross reallocation rate
(pos+neg), net = net employment growth rate (pos-neg), excess = excess job reallocation rate (gross-
|net|). (*): Figures refer to averages over the years 1989-1995 for Belgium, 1988-1995 for The
Netherlands and Germany, 1987-1995 for U.K. Using averages, job flows rate definitions do not hold
exactly. Rankings are in order of increasingly loose regulation (Bertola, 1990).
How do the results for transition countries reported in table 2 compare to gross
job flows of mature market economies? At the bottom of Table 2, we present some
international comparisons. Annual average job flow rates for four Western European
economies are computed using comparable data
6. In addition, following Bertola
(1990) and Wells and Grubb (1993), we ranked the countries according to the
                                                                
6All figures reported in Table 2 are computed using the information available in Amadeus CD-ROM
(Dic.1998).13
tightness of the country’s employment protection legislation (EPL), which could be
considered as a proxy for labour market flexibility. Differences in policy towards EPL
and the generosity of the welfare state might be important factors explaining
differences in worker and job flows between countries as suggested by Garibaldi
(1998), Burgess (1999) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1999). In particular, when
employment protection legislation is tough, firing costs are increased which leads to
lower job destruction rates and hence lower job creation rates in equilibrium. Hence,
countries characterised by tough EPL should also be characterised by lower gross job
reallocation. This suggested pattern  is confirmed by the figures on excess job
reallocation. We could consider Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany as belonging
to a group of countries where EPL is relative important and where labour market
flexibility is lower than in the UK (or the US). This is also confirmed by the figures
on excess job reallocation.
The results show that regulated labour markets in Western Europe have a
similar excess job reallocation rate as those for Poland and Slovenia. The Polish
labour market is regulated and characterised by the presence of trade unions and an
active role of employees and trade unions in the wage bargaining process at the firm
level. Also Slovenia has a regulated labour market, characterised by centralised wage
setting for the public sector and “social management” of enterprises. In contrast, the
results for Estonia are more comparable to those of the UK. In fact, by 1997 the
excess job reallocation rate in Estonia is almost 20% which is more comparable to job
reallocation in the US, also a flexible labour market. Bulgaria and Romania are
countries in the early phase of transition, still struggling for adopting reforms and
deregulating the labour market. They are out of equilibrium with job destruction
dominating job creation.14
III.  Job flows by Employer Characteristics
In this section we analyse gross and net job flows by employer characteristics.
We examine differences in job flows by industry, region,  employer size and
ownership type.
In table 3a we document gross job flows according to sector type. Some
sectors have higher/less adjustment cost than others, employ different technologies
and face higher/lower degrees of competition. Thus, one can expect that job flows
also vary according to sectors.
Table 3a: Annual average job flows according to sector classification (NACE code,
rev.1), 1994-1997
Country/Sector pos neg gross net Excess
Poland
Agriculture and fishing 2.0 8.8 10.8 -6.7 4.0
Mining and quarrying 1.0 4.0 5.0 -3.0 2.1
Manufacturing 3.3 5.0 8.3 -1.7 6.5
Electricity, gas and water supply 2.4 4.6 7.0 -2.2 4.8
Construction 5.8 8.5 14.4 -2.7 9.0
Trade 7.5 8.0 15.5 -0.5 13.9
Transport and communication 2.3 10.9 13.2 -8.6 4.6
Business services 6.6 7.2 13.8 -0.7 10.8
Public services 6.6 2.4 9.0 4.2 4.7
Estonia
Agriculture and fishing 4.4 5.9 10.2 -1.5 5.8
Manufacturing 5.0 7.9 12.9 -2.9 9.9
Construction 20.3 7.2 27.5 13.1 13.0
Trade 7.5 10.0 17.2 -2.1 11.3
Transport and communication 9.7 9.9 19.6 -0.2 12.0
Business services 31.0 6.7 37.6 24.3 6.1
Public services 31.4 16.9 48.3 14.5 9.6
Slovenia
Agriculture and fishing 1.4 6.3 7.7 -5.0 2.7
Manufacturing         3.4 4.8 8.2 -1.4 6.4
Electricity, gas and water supply 0.5 0.7 1.2 -0.1 0.4
Construction 9.7 3.9 13.6 5.7 7.4
Trade 4.9 4.1 9.1 0.8 5.6
Transport and communication 2.7 11.6 14.3 -8.9 3.4
Business services 26.6 9.2 35.8 17.4 12.7
Public services 9.3 0.7 10.0 8.6 1.4
Bulgaria
Agriculture and fishing 4.4 15.0 19.4 -10.6 5.0
Mining and quarrying 1.7 3.8 5.6 -2.1 1.9
Manufacturing 2.4 5.6 8.0 -3.2 4.6
Electricity, gas and water supply 3.0 2.8 5.8 0.3 1.315
Construction 2.3 7.2 9.5 -4.9 4.6
Trade 3.5 7.4 10.9 -3.9 6.6
Transport and communication 1.1 4.2 5.3 -3.2 2.1
Business services 1.2 11.2 12.4 -10.0 2.4
Public services 7.4 5.5 13.0 1.9 5.0
Romania*
Agriculture and fishing 5.1 14.4 19.6 -9.3 10.3
Mining and quarrying 2.7 7.2 10.0 -4.5 5.4
Manufacturing 3.0 8.1 11.2 -5.1 6.1
Electricity, gas and water supply 1.7 3.3 5.0 -1.5 2.7
Construction 4.6 12.4 17.0 -7.8 9.1
Trade 7.0 9.9 16.9 -2.9 11.9
Transport and communication 2.6 6.6 9.2 -4.0 5.3
Business services 3.3 9.5 12.8 -6.1 6.7
Public services 14.9 7.0 22.0 7.9 14.1
Note: (*) Romanian figures refer to 1995-1997 averages.
Table 3b: Correlation coefficients between excess job reallocation and net employment







We find indeed quite heterogeneous behaviour in terms of job creation and
destruction across sectors and countries. While some sectors have a positive net
employment growth, most have a negative, but the underlying gross job creation and
destruction rates and hence the excess job reallocation rates vary substantially. Thus,
even within narrowly defined sectors there exists simultaneous creation and
destruction of jobs. The different degrees of job reallocation across sectors show that
sectors are not only heterogeneous, but also firms within sectors are heterogeneous.
We suggested in the previous section that the excess job reallocation rate might be a
could indicator of the degree of restructuring that is going on in a transition economy.
If restructuring is positive for growth, we should expect a positive correlation between
employment growth at the sector level and the excess job reallocation rate. In table 3b
we report the correlation coefficients between excess job reallocation and
employment growth at the sector level, pooled over all the years for which we have
observations for each country. For all countries we find a positive correlation16
coefficient, which is consistent with the idea that excess job reallocation is a measure
of restructuring that is going on.
In transition, the regional clustering of industries, pursued under central
planning, is dismantled. With the implementation of reforms, market forces will
change the economic structure artificially imposed on regions under central planning.
Thus, one can expect that in transition not only some sectors, but also some regions
are hit more than others. Annual average job flows according to regional units are
presented in Tables 4-8 for each of the five transition countries, respectively. All
countries, except for Bulgaria, report high excess job reallocation rates in the capital
districts, which are densely populated and have the necessary infrastructure for
attracting investment and for supporting economic activity. Just as there are
differences in job flows across sectors, each country shows differences in job flows
across regions. Some regions have a positive net employment growth, while others
have a negative. Thus, some regions are expanding, while others are contracting.
While Poland and Slovenia have a larger number of expanding regions, i.e.
regions with a positive net employment growth rate, Estonia has on average more
dynamic regions, i.e. regions characterised by simultaneously high job creation and
job destruction rates, and thus by high excess job reallocation rates. Bulgaria and
Romania are characterised by higher job destruction rates than job creation rates, even
if some regions in Romania, such as ‘Timis’, ‘Botosani’ and ‘Bihor’, appear
comparable to those in the most advanced countries, showing very high job creation,
job destruction and excess job reallocation rates. In addition, job flow regional
dispersion is much more pronounced in Romania than in Bulgaria.
In table 9 we also report the correlation coefficients between excess job
reallocation and net employment growth at the regional level. Again we find for all
countries a positive correlation between excess job reallocation and net employment
growth, which suggests that higher flexibility or turbulence leads to higher growth.
Alternatively, it suggests that regions, which have restructured more, have higher
growth. This finding and the findings of table 3b are consistent with the theoretical
predictions of Aghion and Howitt (1994) suggesting a positive correlation between
job reallocation and growth. This is the result of a process of Schumpeterian
competition in which unproductive production units (jobs) are replaced with more
productive ones, leading to higher growth.17
Table 4: Annual average job flows in Poland according to regional units, 1994-1997
Voivodship pos Neg gross net excess
Warszawskie 4.7 5.4 10.1 -0.6 9.0
Bialskopodlaskie 5.8 1.0 6.8 4.8 1.8
Bialostockie 2.5 3.4 5.9 -0.9 4.5
Bielskie 2.9 4.5 7.4 -1.6 5.7
Bydgoskie 2.6 3.2 5.8 -0.6 5.1
Chelmskie 2.4 2.2 4.7 0.2 3.7
Ciechanowskie 2.0 6.2 8.2 -4.2 3.1
Czestochowskie 1.7 4.6 6.3 -2.9 3.4
Elblaskie 4.3 6.5 10.8 -2.2 8.2
Gdanskie 3.1 10.1 13.3 -7.0 6.3
Gorzowskie 5.9 3.8 9.7 2.0 4.0
Jeleniogorskie 2.3 2.2 4.5 0.1 2.2
Kaliskie 3.7 3.4 7.1 0.4 4.0
Katowickie 1.6 5.6 7.2 -4.0 3.2
Kieleckie 3.4 5.6 9.0 -2.1 6.7
Koninskie 1.1 3.3 4.4 -2.2 1.6
Koszalinskie 2.2 5.7 7.9 -3.4 4.1
Krakowskie 3.2 5.5 8.7 -2.3 4.7
Krosnienskie 4.5 5.6 10.2 -1.1 3.3
Legnickie 2.1 5.3 7.5 -3.2 4.2
Leszczynskie 4.0 1.9 5.9 2.1 3.7
Lubelskie 5.7 5.7 11.5 -0.1 5.8
Lomzynskie 1.8 6.5 8.3 -4.7 1.9
Lodzkie 2.2 4.8 7.0 -2.6 4.3
Nowosadeckie 2.7 9.2 11.8 -6.5 5.3
Olsztynskie 5.1 2.8 7.9 2.2 4.3
Opolskie 3.2 5.3 8.5 -2.1 5.2
Ostroleckie 11.5 0.7 12.2 10.7 1.5
Pilskie 13.0 6.6 19.6 6.4 2.9
Piotrkowskie  1.6 3.1 4.8 -1.5 2.4
Plockie 2.2 3.8 6.0 -1.5 4.4
Poznanskie 3.8 7.2 10.7 -3.4 6.8
Przemyskie 5.5 3.3 8.8 2.2 4.4
Radomskie 4.1 4.7 8.8 -0.6 5.1
Rzeszowskie 6.2 4.1 10.4 2.1 4.4
Siedleckie 2.5 3.6 6.1 -1.0 3.4
Sieradzkie 1.6 2.6 4.2 -1.0 1.1
Skierniewickie 2.1 9.6 11.8 -7.5 4.0
Slupskie 1.8 5.0 6.9 -3.2 3.7
Suwalskie 6.6 0.7 7.3 5.9 1.4
Szczecinskie 4.5 4.2 8.7 0.3 6.6
Tarnobrzeskie 1.5 5.2 6.8 -3.7 1.9
Tarnowskie 1.2 3.4 4.6 -2.1 2.3
Torunskie 2.9 7.6 10.5 -4.6 5.9
Walbrzychskie 1.3 6.3 7.6 -5.0 2.6
Wloclawskie 1.4 3.1 4.5 -1.7 2.3
Wroclawskie 4.7 5.1 9.9 -0.4 8.6
Zamojskie 2.0 4.2 6.2 -2.2 2.9
Zielonogorskie 3.3 8.1 11.4 -4.8 4.418
Table 5: Annual average job flows in Estonia according to regional units, 1994-1997
Group of Maakond pos Neg gross net excess
Põhja-Eesti 4.6 6.0 10.6 -1.4 7.5
         Tallinn* 11.3 9.4 20.7 1.9 15.6
Kesk-Eesti 3.8 5.4 9.2 -1.6 7.2
Kirde-Eesri 4.4 8.9 13.4 -4.5 6.0
Lääne-Eesti 3.9 4.9 8.8 -1.0 6.4
Lõuna-Eesti 6.3 8.4 14.7 -2.1 10.3
Note: (*) Tallinn belongs to Põhja-Eesti.
Table 6: Annual average job flows in Slovenia according to regional units, 1994-1997
Statisticne Regije pos Neg gross net excess
Pomurska 1.5 3.4 4.8 -1.9 2.7
Podravska 6.0 6.1 12.1 -0.1 9.3
Koroška 7.7 4.5 12.2 3.1 4.9
Savinjska  3.2 4.1 7.3 -1.0 5.8
Zasavska 1.5 3.9 5.5 -2.4 3.1
Spodnjeposavska 1.0 4.6 5.7 -3.6 2.1
Dolenjska 5.0 5.2 10.1 -0.2 7.3
Osrednjeslovenska 2.5 6.6 9.1 -4.1 5.0
      Ljubljana* 7.4 7.0 10.4 0.4 10.2
Gorenjska 4.5 4.4 8.8 0.1 7.5
Notranjsko-kraška 2.4 3.1 5.5 -0.6 4.3
Goriška 2.5 3.7 6.2 -1.2 3.6
Obalno-kraška 2.3 5.0 7.3 -2.6 4.7
Note: (*): Ljubljana belongs to Osrednjeslovenska.19
Table 7: Annual average job flows in Bulgaria according to regional units, 1994-1997
Oblast/Group of Obshtini pos Neg gross net excess
Sofia-grad 2.2 5.4 7.6 -3.2 4.4
Sofia-oblast
Sofia 3.8 3.6 7.4 0.1 3.6
Pernik 1.7 5.6 7.3 -4.0 3.3
Kjustendil 1.6 4.8 6.3 -3.2 2.9
Blagoevgrad 3.1 5.1 8.1 -2.0 5.2
Montana-oblast
Vratza 2.5 6.5 9.1 -4.0 4.7
Montana 2.2 6.1 8.4 -3.9 4.2
Vidin 1.1 7.3 8.4 -6.1 2.2
Plovdiv-oblast
Plovdiv 3.1 7.0 10.1 -3.9 6.2
Pazardjik 1.7 5.1 6.8 -3.4 3.1
Smoljan 2.2 4.9 7.1 -2.7 2.1
Lovech-oblast
Veliko Tarnovo 2.6 4.9 7.5 -2.4 4.8
Gabrovo 3.1 5.0 8.1 -1.8 5.9
Lovech 2.7 5.3 8.0 -2.6 5.4
Pleven 2.5 6.5 9.0 -4.1 4.9
Haskovo-oblast
Stara Zagora 2.8 5.1 7.9 -2.3 2.2
Haskovo 2.0 5.0 6.9 -3.0 3.2
Kardjali 2.9 8.1 11.0 -5.1 5.9
Ruse-oblast
Ruse 1.6 6.1 7.7 -4.4 2.7
Razgrad 2.6 3.9 6.6 -1.3 4.2
Silistra 1.7 6.5 8.2 -4.8 3.3
Targovishte 2.4 4.9 7.3 -2.5 4.1
Burgas-oblast
Burgas 2.2 5.8 8.0 -3.7 4.1
Jambol 2.2 7.9 10.1 -5.8 4.1
Sliven 2.7 6.0 8.7 -3.3 3.8
Varna-oblast
Varna 2.1 6.0 8.1 -3.9 4.1
Dobrich 3.8 7.1 10.8 -3.3 6.2
Shumen 2.5 5.0 7.5 -2.5 4.720
Table 8: Annual average job flows in Romania according to regional units, 1995-1997
Judet pos Neg gross net excess
Municipiul Bucuresti 4.5 9.3 13.8 -4.8 9.0
Alba 3.3 6.1 9.4 -2.8 6.6
Arad 4.8 7.9 12.7 -3.1 9.6
Arges 6.4 8.3 14.7 -1.9 9.3
Bacãu 3.2 7.0 10.3 -3.8 6.5
Bihor 8.0 9.9 17.9 -1.8 12.4
Bistrita-Nãsãud 2.2 9.7 12.0 -7.5 4.5
Botosani 9.2 6.7 16.0 2.5 13.3
Brasov 2.3 7.8 10.0 -5.5 4.6
Brãila 3.9 13.4 17.4 -9.5 7.8
Buzãu 2.4 10.7 13.2 -8.3 4.9
Caras-Severin 2.0 7.3 9.3 -5.3 4.0
Cãlãrasi 4.1 13.3 17.4 -9.2 6.7
Cluj 2.6 7.1 9.7 -4.5 5.2
Constanta 5.2 12.0 17.2 -6.8 10.4
Covasna 2.9 4.8 7.7 -1.9 5.7
Dâmbovita 1.3 7.4 8.7 -6.0 2.7
Dolj 3.1 9.6 12.7 -6.5 6.2
Galati 2.0 5.1 7.1 -3.0 4.1
Giurgiu 3.6 12.3 15.9 -8.8 7.1
Gorj 2.4 8.1 10.5 -5.7 4.8
Harghita 4.7 7.7 12.4 -3.0 9.2
Hunedoara 1.4 5.5 7.0 -4.1 2.8
Ialomita 6.0 11.0 17.1 -5.0 8.9
Iasi 3.4 7.7 11.1 -4.3 6.8
Maramures 3.2 11.9 15.1 -8.7 6.4
Mehedinti 4.5 8.0 12.5 -3.5 7.9
Mures 2.8 8.9 11.7 -6.2 5.5
Neamt 2.7 10.7 13.5 -8.0 5.4
Olt 4.5 9.3 13.8 -4.7 9.1
Prahova 5.2 11.8 17.0 -6.5 9.3
Satu Mare 2.7 8.3 11.0 -5.6 5.4
Sãlaj 3.3 7.7 11.1 -4.4 6.7
Sibiu 2.7 8.2 11.0 -5.5 5.5
Suceava 3.0 10.9 13.9 -7.9 6.0
Teleorman 2.0 10.6 12.5 -8.6 3.9
Timis 12.9 12.6 25.4 0.3 11.0
Tulcea 6.7 9.0 15.7 -2.3 9.4
Vaslui 3.4 7.2 10.6 -3.7 6.2
Vâlcea 3.8 8.5 12.3 -4.6 6.5
Vrancea 7.2 11.0 18.2 -3.7 11.721
Table 9: Correlation coefficients between excess job reallocation and net employment







We next look at gross job flows according to enterprise ownership types in
table 10. There is a common pattern that holds across countries. Foreign firms in
Poland, Bulgaria and Romania have higher job creation and excess job reallocation
rates than state firms, while job destruction rates are lower. Except in Bulgaria,
foreign firms are net expanders. Unfortunately, we do not have ownership information
on Estonian and Slovenian firms. Nevertheless, from other sources (EBRD, 1998), we
know that Estonia has been characterised by high levels of inward foreign direct
investment (FDI) since the first privatisation program in 1991-1992. In Slovenia, FDI
has been discouraged by excluding foreigners from the privatisation process and by
the gradual introduction of capital account restrictions since 1995
7. Buch and
Hanschel (1999) report the ratio between FDI and gross capital inflows for a number
of Central Eastern European countries over the years 1992-1997. As expected, the
ratio is higher in Estonia (32.5%) than in Slovenia (18.9%). However, the Slovenian
ratio is very similar to those reported by other countries, e.g. 19% in Czech Republic
over the same period.
                                                                
7Capital account restrictions on foreign loans and deposits are in the form of reserve requirements and
they have been reduced from 40%-10% to 0% (de facto eliminated) in February 1999.22
Table 10: Annual average gross and net job flow rates according to ownership type
1994-1997
Country/Size Pos neg gross net Excess
Poland
State firms 1.6 4.2 5.8 -2.5 3.3
Foreign firms 9.4 2.9 12.3 6.5 5.8
Domestic private
firms
5.0 4.3 9.3 0.7 7.9
Bulgaria
State firms 1.9 5.6 7.5 -3.7 3.7
Foreign firms 3.6 4.8 8.3 -1.2 5.6
Domestic private
firms
2.8 6.0 8.8 -3.2 5.6
Romania*
State firms 2.3 9.5 11.8 -7.2 4.6
Foreign firms 15.1 4.3 19.4 10.7 8.7
Domestic private
firms
5.3 8.7 14.0 -3.4 10.6
Note: (*) Romanian figures refer to 1995-1997 averages.
Domestic private firms are a residual category. Ownership information is not available for
Estonia and Slovenia.
The speed of transition at the individual employer level appears to be linked to
ownership. Foreign owned enterprises are the most dynamic ones in terms of job
creation. Being free from political and social constraints, they are able to fire
unproductive workers and hire new ones, destroy inefficient jobs and create efficient
ones, close down plants and establish new ones. Thus, they are able to undertake the
fundamental changes necessary for restructuring. Foreign firms bring about new
physical and human capital and can implement reforms at the firm level more easily
and hence generate positive spillovers. The corporate governance structure is such
that the majority of the shares  is held by outside foreign owners which makes
restructuring easier.
When we look at the gross job creation and destruction rates of private
domestic firms we can note that the former is always larger than the one in state firms,
while the latter is very comparable. This suggests that privatisation leads to better
performance in terms of gross job creation, although this is not immediately clear
from just looking at the net employment growth rate. The excess job reallocation rate
is also always higher than the one in state firms, which suggests that privatised firms
engage more in restructuring that state owned ones do. This is what one would expect23
since state owned firms anticipate privatisation in the future which could lead to less
incentives to engage in restructuring as suggested by Aghion et al. (1995).
A final way to slice the data consists in analysing job flows by employer size
class in table 11. It should be noticed that our sample understates the presence of
micro-businesses in these economies. Small firms in our sample refer to the class 0-
249 employees, where the majority of firms are concentrated in the sub-class 100-249.
 For all countries, small businesses are the most dynamic in terms of excess
job reallocation. They have higher gross job creation rates, but also higher job
destruction rates. This feature is a statistical regularity found for all western
economies and is often explained by the selection and learning effects associated with
young and small enterprises (Jovanovic, 1982). By 1997, after a period of
considerable “cleansing” of large enterprises, some of the patterns observed for
western market-based economies appear to be emerging in transition economies,
although less pronounced.
Table 11: Annual average gross and net job flow rates according to firm size, 1994-1997
Country/Size pos neg gross net excess
Bulgaria
0-249 2.6 8.0 10.6 -5.3 5.3
250-499 2.8 7.2 10.0 -4.4 5.6
500-999 2.7 6.9 9.6 -4.2 5.3
+1000 2.2 4.2 6.5 -2.0 4.1
Romania*
0-249 7.5 15.4 22.9 -7.9 15.0
250-499 5.2 13.1 18.3 -7.9 10.4
500-999 3.7 11.8 15.6 -8.1 7.5
+1000 3.2 6.2 9.4 -3.1 6.4
Estonia
0-249 7.1 12.7 19.8 -5.6 12.9
250-499 6.2 9.6 15.9 -3.4 12.1
500-999 9.1 4.5 13.6 4.5 7.6
+1000 12.9 9.3 22.2 3.6 13.5
Poland
0-249 7.9 15.6 23.4 -7.7 15.7
250-499 6.1 9.4 15.5 -3.4 11.9
500-999 4.5 7.2 11.7 -2.7 9.0
+1000 3.1 5.3 8.4 -2.2 6.2
Slovenia
0-249 4.4 6.7 11.2 -2.3 8.9
250-499 3.7 5.1 8.9 -1.4 6.9
500-999 5.5 5.4 10.9 0.2 10.1
+1000 4.3 4.6 8.9 -0.3 5.8
Note: (*) Romanian figures refer to 1995-1997 averages.24
IV.  Decomposition of the excess job reallocation
Having presented the basic patterns of job flows by employer characteristics,
i.e. sectors, regions, ownership types and employer sizes, a useful way to summarise
the results is to consider the role of employment shifts between and within sectors,
regions, ownership types and employer sizes. This is important because it can reveal
the micro economic nature of transition. In particular, it is often believed that
transition takes the form of reallocation of resources from declining sectors to
growing ones and from declining regions to growing ones, which would imply that
the sectoral and the regional composition of the economy would drastically change as
transition proceeds. However, we will show that this is not the case for the transition
countries that we study here. In fact, most of the reallocation of jobs occurs within,
rather than across sectors and regions.
Following Davis and Haltiwanger (1990), we decompose the excess job
reallocation rate into the between and within components. Considering for instance
sectors, the between contribution is measured by summing across sectors the
deviation of the absolute net employment change for every sector from the absolute
net employment change of the overall economy. The within contribution is measured
as the sum across sectors of the excess job reallocation in each sector. Equation (1)
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where t and t-1 refer to period t and period t-1, while s refers to sector s of the whole
set S. The same formula applies to regions, ownership types and employer sizes.
In tables 12-15 we report the between component of this decomposition.
Overall, employment shifts within the same 1-digit sector (Table12), region (Table
13), employer size (Table14) and enterprise type (Table15),  account for the vast
majority of job reallocation.
Table 12 shows the fraction of excess job reallocation that is due to the
between sectors component. Only in Estonia, almost 30% of the excess job25
reallocation can be accounted for by between sector shifts in 1997. All the other
countries have lower fractions. Thus the job reallocation rates in transition countries
should be considered primarily as reflecting employment shifts among firms in the
same one-digit industries. Compared to the US and Canada the shifts of jobs between
sectors in transition countries are still substantial. Baldwin  et al.(1998) report that
between-sector shifts only account for 2.5% of excess job reallocation in Canada and
3.6% of excess job reallocation in the US.
For Poland, Bulgaria and Romania, we are able to compute the fraction of
excess job reallocation resulting from employment shifts between 2-digit industries,
the results were very similar.
Tables 13, 14 and 15 show the same decomposition for regions, size classes of
firms and enterprise ownership types. The same result emerges at the one discussed
above. The between region/size class/ownership type shifts account for a minor
fraction of excess job reallocation in transition countries. In Estonia, however, we
always find that a larger fraction of job reallocation can be explained by ‘between
shifts’. This may be due to the fact that Estonia is a very small open economy with a
limited number of firms in each region or sector.
Table 12 Fraction of excess job reallocation resulting from employment shifts between
sectors (in %)
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997
Poland 0.1 2.7 2.5 15.7
Estonia 18.3 28.5 35.0 28.9
Slovenia 14.2 27.9 57.6 10.5
Bulgaria 23.7 12.3 5.0
Romania 0.9 6.5 26.9
Note: Sectors are classified according to the NACE Rev.1, 1-digit classification.
Table 13: Fraction of excess job reallocation resulting from employment shifts between
regions (in %)
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997
Poland 14.1 20.1 12.3 26.6
Estonia 3.0 16.1 13.9 26.7
Slovenia 17.2 17.8 29.3 0.6
Bulgaria 30.3 2.6 1.1
Romania 8.0 21.9 0.6
Note: Regions are classified according to the Eurostat Nomenclature for statistical regions in Central
European countries (level 3): 28 counties in Bulgaria, 41 in Romania, 5 in Estonia, 49 in Poland and 12
in Slovenia.26
Table 14: Fraction of excess job reallocation resulting from employment shifts between
employer sizes  (in %)
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997
Poland 0.1 1.0 2.2 2.3
Estonia 20.5 35.3 2.9 26.4
Slovenia 9.3 9.8 29.7 0.0
Bulgaria 4.1 6.4 1.1
Romania 0.6 0.0 0.0
Note: Employer size classes are 0-49, 50-99, 100-249, 250-499, 500-999 and +1000.
Table 15: Fraction of excess job reallocation resulting from employment shifts between
enterprise types (in %)
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997
Poland 6.1 10.8 12.7 5.4
Bulgaria 6.3 0.9 0.0
Romania 6.1 1.9 2.3
Note: Enterprise type categories are foreign-owned, state-owned and domestic enterprises.27
V.  Job reallocation at the firm level
The reported gross job flows in the previous sections are the result of
simultaneous contraction and expansion of firms in a sector or region. In this section
we identify the factors that determine firm level job creation and destruction, i.e. firm
level expansion and contraction. Following the growth-of-firms literature (Audretsch,
1995; Sutton, 1997), we look at the relationship between firm employment growth
and firm size, but enlarge our specification in order to take into account transition-
specific effects, i.e. trade orientation and ownership effects. In the related literature,
the relationship between firm growth and size has been discussed in the context of
Gibrat’s Law, which states that proportionate growth rates of employment
8 are
independent of firm size. Many empirical studies for western economies find a
negative relationship between firm size and growth, leading to a rejection of Gibrat’s
Law. In the context of transition, the failure of the Gibrat’s Law might be interpreted
as a test of initial restructuring of large enterprises: under central planning firms were
too large and inefficient by the standards of market economies. Transition requires at
first the downsizing of large state-owned enterprises. Therefore, looking at the
relationship between firm growth and firm size, we might expect to find a negative
and significant effect of initial size on firm growth.
In the following analysis, we test also the relevance of trade orientation effects
to employment firm growth. According to Repkine and Walsh (1999), in early
transition viable firms were those in trade oriented sectors, i.e. sectors exporting
towards the EU markets before the collapse of central planning. Repkine and Walsh
(1999) notice that in Central and Eastern Europe a substantial number of sectors was
trading with Western Europe before the collapse of communism. For such sectors, the
production of a viable competitive good was important in order to be able to export to
a market economy. In contrast, sectors producing for the Soviet market were guided
by the central planner without taking into account demand patterns and viability. With
the collapse of central planning, it is therefore possible to observe simultaneously
viable firms, which are able to sustain production and face increasingly international
competition, while other firms produce low quality goods and are subject to
downsizing, restructuring or eventually exit.
                                                                
8 Gibrat’s Law as stated by Gibrat in his seminal article (1931) may refer to any measure of firm
economic activity, such employment, sales, investment, profit and value added.28
We follow Repkine and Walsh (1999) and take their indicator of trade
orientation, which identifies sectors that were having trade flows to the EU already in
1988
9. We expect that in early transition viable firms, operating in ‘traded’ sectors,
have a better performance than firms operating in ‘non-traded’ sectors. The reason for
this is that firms operating in ‘traded’ sectors were exposed to competitive markets
already during central planning and therefore were forced to produce viable products.
Such firms need less restructuring or will restructure in the very early phases of
transition as they have incentives given that they are producing a viable product and
therefore they have a potential for growth. Firms operating in the ‘non-traded’ sectors,
however, were producing non-viable products, imposed by the central planner. With
the collapse of communism the (artificial) demand for their products also collapsed.
Restructuring in those type of firms might prove to be much more difficult or not even
feasible (Repkine and Walsh, 1999).
We use the following specification to test employment growth at the firm
level, which can explain gross job flows at the aggregate level:
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where the dependent variable (Dni, t) is the annual employment growth rate for firm i
at time t and  ni, t-2 is the log firm size at time t-2. We further include a trade
orientation dummy ( trade), ownership dummies (foreign and state, the benchmark
being domestic private), interaction terms between lagged firm size and ownership
dummies, regional and time dummies (variables in Xj). ei,t is an error term.
Following Hamilton (1998), we use robust regression analysis to estimate
equation (2). Robust estimation achieves almost OLS efficiency in situations in which
the error terms are independently but not normally distributed. We believe this to be a
sensible approach given that there are a large number of outliers in our sample and
                                                                
9 A sector is classified as a ‘traded’ sector if the fraction of sector export flows over the total export
flows in the corresponding industry is greater than 5%. A sector is defined according to the Nace-Clio
3-digit classification, while an industry by the corresponding Nace-Clio 2-digit classification.29
that we are dealing with transition data
10. The results obtained are reported in Tables
16-20.
We use five nested specifications and start with discussing the effects of
ownership on firm level employment growth for the three countries, Poland, Bulgaria
and Romania, for which ownership data were available. We find that in all
specifications for Poland and Romania there exists a negative effect of state
ownership on firm employment growth compared to majority domestic private
ownership, while in Bulgaria the negative effect of state ownership drops out once
controlling for firm size (see column 4). Since the effect of firm size controls for
initial restructuring (the downsizing which was necessary to eliminate labor
hoarding), we pick up a pure ownership effect on firm growth or firm performance.
The fact that we do not find a negative effect of state firms in Bulgaria suggests that
in the country domestic private or privatised firms have very similar performance
compared to state firms. This could be an indication that in privatised firms not much
restructuring has occurred, perhaps due to a dominant presence of insiders. In column
(5) we allow for different initial size effects according to different categories of firms.
In this case, the direct effect of state ownership on firm growth is negative also in
Bulgaria. However, for larger firms the initial size effect disappears, which can be
seen from the positive interaction effect. A positive interaction effect between lagged
size and state ownership is found for all the three countries, which suggests that larger
state firms do not perform worse than large privatised firms. This also implies that, if
firms did not engage in initial downsizing (restructuring), privatised firms and state
firms perform in a very similar way. Thus, privatisation only works if firms have
engaged sufficiently in initial restructuring. This result confirms earlier work based on
firm level survey data in which no significant difference was found between
privatised and state owned enterprises (Konings, 1997; Richter and Schaffer, 1996).
The results for foreign ownership indicate that foreign firms perform – not
surprisingly – better than state and privatised firms, at least in Poland and Romania
(column 5). In Bulgaria, however, once we control for different size effects according
to ownership, foreign firms do not perform any better.
                                                                
10 We performed also OLS estimations; the sign of the estimates are similar, but the significance levels
are lower.30
The results on ownership are consistent with the gross job flows that we
reported according to ownership. We also find that on average privatised firms have
engaged in initial downsizing, which can be seen from the negative and significant
coefficient of lagged size on employment. As noticed, this effect is counter-acted for
state firms, such that in state firms there is no initial size effect. This indicates that on
average privatised firms have downsized more than state firms, which will lead to a
better performance of privatised firms compared to state firms. However, privatised
firms that did not downsize have the same employment performance as state firms.
Although we do not have information on ownership for Estonia and Slovenia we find
a strong negative initial size effect for these countries. Interestingly, the size effect is
largest in Estonia (-0.04), followed by Slovenia (-0.014) and Poland (-0.01) and then
Romania and Bulgaria (-0.006). Thus, large firms in the more advanced countries
downsize faster than large firms in the more backward countries. This might reflect
the continued government intervention in large firms in Bulgaria and Romania.
Finally, we find that trade orientation has a positive effect in Romania and
Bulgaria on employment growth, but a negative one in Estonia and Slovenia, while in
Poland we do not find any statistically significant effect. This suggests that in early
transition product viability, measured by trade orientation, matters. As transition
progresses, the effect of trade orientation on firm performance becomes negligible or
even negative. Firms in trade oriented sectors are exposed to international competition
which increases as transition proceeds. The effects of competition on firm
performance can be of two types. It might be that a high level of product market
competition is detrimental for firm performance
11. Firms in transition economies are
unprepared for aggressive competition and, not supported, are likely to exit. On this
basis, a gradual approach to trade and capital flows liberalisation has been suggested
and adopted in some countries, such as in Slovenia (EBRD, 1998). It is also possible
that a high degree of competition enhances firm restructuring and thus the downsizing
of larger firms, as it has been the case in Estonia (EBRD, 1998). Both effects predict a
negative relationship between firm growth and the trade orientation dummy in the
most advanced countries. In our analysis we can not distinguish between these two
different effects of competition on firm performance.31
Table 16: Firm growth regression results (robust estimation), Poland
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)














































Regional dummies No No Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
n. of obs. 7901 1330 1274 738 738
Note: (a): significant at 1% level, (b): significant at 5% level and (c): significant at 10% level; standard
errors are reported in brackets.
                                                                                                                                                                                         
11 Several theoretical contributions on the relation between market structure and innovation have
suggested a negative effect of tough competition on the rate of inventive activity (see among others the
seminal paper by Kamien and Schwartz, 1968, and more recently Aghion and Howitt, 1994).32














Regional dummies No Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
n. of obs. 893 893 535
Note: (a): significant at 1% level, (b): significant at 5% level and (c): significant at 10% level; standard
errors are reported in brackets.














Regional dummies No Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
n. of obs. 2026 2026 1482
Note: (a): significant at 1% level, (b): significant at 5% level and (c): significant at 10% level; standard
errors are reported in brackets.33
Table 19: Firm growth regression results (robust estimation), Bulgaria
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
















































Regional dummies No No Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
n. of obs. 7865 6891 6891 4679 4679
Note: (a): significant at 1% level, (b): significant at 5% level and (c): significant at 10% level;
standard errors are reported in brackets.
Table 20: Firm growth regression results (robust estimation), Romania




















































Regional dummies No No Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
n. of obs. 11023 8146 8146 5203 5203
Note: (a): significant at 1% level, (b): significant at 5% level and (c): significant at 10% level; standard
errors are reported in brackets.34
VI. Summary and conclusions
This paper is the first to present a comprehensive and comparable analysis of
job flows during the transition process. Using an exceptionally rich data set on firm
level data over the years 1993-1997, we analyse the dynamics of job flows in five
transition countries, Poland, Estonia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania. We find that in
the early stages of transition job destruction dominates job creation. However, as
transition progresses, job destruction equals job destruction in the more advanced
countries, such as Poland, Estonia and Slovenia, while job destruction remains high in
the less advanced countries, such as Bulgaria and Romania.
We find also that gross job reallocation varies across countries and that job flow
rates in the more advanced countries are comparable to those found in Western
economies. In addition, differences across countries may be linked to differences in
labour and product market flexibility due to employment protection legislation (EPL)
and openness of the economy.
It seems that a rapid approach to reforms, like in Estonia, has resulted in higher
job flows rates than those shown by other countries, like in Slovenia, where a more
gradual approach to reforms has been adopted.
We find that firms, even in transition economies which are hit by severe shocks,
behave in a very heterogeneous way regarding their employment decisions. We find
that even within narrowly defined sectors, regions and firm size classes, there exists
simultaneous creation and destruction of jobs. We suggest that a good indicator of
restructuring is measured by the excess job reallocation rate and we demonstrate that
there is a positive correlation between the excess job reallocation rate and net
employment growth at the regional and sector level.  Moreover, we show that job
reallocation occurs predominantly within sectors and regions rather than between
sectors and regions, which suggests that we should think of transition not in terms of
job flows from declining sectors or regions to growing ones, but rather in terms from
declining firms to growing firms within the same sector and region.
Finally, we analyse the job reallocation process at the firm level. We find that
job creation is explained by initial downsizing (firm size), ownership and trade
orientation effects. The latter could be seen as a proxy for firm viability. In addition,
we find that large state firms perform the same as large privatised firms, however, if35
the latter have downsized, they will do better. Foreign firms perform better compared
to privatised firms and state ones. Finally, the effect of initial downsizing is largest in
the more advanced countries.
The results in this paper suggest that also in transition countries a lot of
turbulence occurs, which cannot be seen if one just looks at the macro economic data.
It also suggests that the restructuring process is one that is very heterogeneous and
specific to certain sectors and regions.36
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